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EMPATHY AND EVALUATIVE INQUIRY
JUSTIN D'ARMs*
The emotions are back in fashion in academic and intellectual
circles. The declining influence of behaviorism in the social sciences
and of positivism in legal and philosophical scholarship has rendered
these disciplines more hospitable to explorations of emotional
phenomena within various theoretical frameworks. Emotions are
celebrated not only as necessary constituents of a psychologically
healthy human life, but also as expressions of, rather than
impediments to, our nature as rational animals.' Against the thought
that emotions systematically distort our sense of what matters and
why, it is now often said that emotional reactions reflect or embody
our most important evaluative commitments. Indeed emotions are
held by some contemporary writers to reveal, and perhaps even to
constitute, distinctive forms of value.' Humanists, legal scholars, and
social scientists are also increasingly interested in the emotions as
motivators and regulators of moral behavior, as well as of various
3
other kinds of social interaction that make communal life possible.
* Professor of Philosophy, Ohio State University. This Article has benefitted greatly
from discussion with the participants in a seminar at Ohio State University, and from written
comments by John Doris, Daniel Jacobson, David Merli, Kathleen Schmidt, and, especially,
Heidi Li Feldman. I am also grateful to Elizabeth Anderson and David Hills for comments on
an earlier Article treating some of these ideas.
1. Pertinent sources include RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION
(1987); PATRICIA GREENSPAN, EMOTIONS AND REASONS: AN ENQUIRY INTO EMOTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION (1988); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); ROBERT
THE PASSIONS (1976); GABRIELLE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT:
EMOTIONS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT (1985); and many of the contributions to EXPLAINING
SOLOMON,

EMOTIONS (Amelie Rorty ed., 1980).
2. This way of putting the claims comes from MICHAEL STOCKER & ELIZABETH
HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS 57-59 (1996). Other philosophers who seem to accept these
claims include ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1-5 (1993); Justin

D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotion,
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. (forthcoming); Robert Roberts, What an Emotion Is: A
Sketch, 97 PHIL. REV. 183 (1988).
3. This interest has been especially prominent among (though by no means confined to)
feminists and other authors concerned with exploring the idea that emotions have been underemphasized in previous thought about society and morality because they have been conceived
at once as feminine and as irrational. See, e.g., ANNETrE BALER, MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS
ON ETHICS (1994); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 1-3 (1982); ALISON JAGGAR,

FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 114-15 (1983); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A
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This renewed interest in emotion has now expanded to include
economists and evolutionary psychologists exploring the adaptive
4
role of emotions in social conflict and cooperation.
Of course, the historical distinction between reason and passion
and the allied idea that the conditions for good legal and ethical
judgment are cool and dispassionate, is not wholly without merit. It
should be granted that emotions can distort good judgment.
Sometimes things are not as they seem to us when we are in the grip
of an emotional reaction. Not everything we are ashamed of is really
shameful, not everything that angers us is really objectionable.
Let us call such cases instances of emotional "error." The
possibility of emotional error shows that it would be a mistake to trust
one's emotional reactions in every case. But it is important to
recognize that the mere possibility of emotional error is an
insufficient basis for returning to an older conception of judgment
and evaluation that aspires to immunize these processes from
emotional influence. After all, sensory error is possible as well. But
to grant that vision and hearing can produce illusions and mistaken
beliefs is not to grant that these sensory modalities have no role to
play in rational judgment. Furthermore, evaluative judgments in
particular seem to be so intimately connected to our emotional
reactions to the world that it is far from obvious how these forms of
judgment could proceed without emotional influence. The possibility
of emotional error should be treated as a reason for caution and
fallibilism about our emotional reactions, rather than as a reason to
attempt to purge them completely.
This Article focuses on the phenomenon of empathy in light of
the increasingly popular ideas sketched above. Any attempt to
understand the role of emotional responses in human life should
include a study of the ways in which different people's emotions are
brought into harmony or conflict with one another. Propensities for
and susceptibilities to mutual influence are crucial to successful social
interactions, as well as to our collective and individual reflection on
what sorts of lives are worth living and why. There are a great many
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION 7-9 (1984); NAOMI SCHEMAN,
ENGENDERINGS 4-5 (1993); see also LAWRENCE BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND
MORALITY 1-3 (1980); LAWRENCE BLUM, MORAL PERCEPTION AND PARTICULARITY 3-5
(1994); MICHAEL SLOTE, GOODS AND VIRTUES (1983).
4. See generally ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988); Jack Hirschliefer,

On Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises, in THE LATEST ON THE BEST 307, 308
(1987); Randolph Nesse, Evolutionary Explanations of Emotions, 1 HUM. NATURE 261 (1990).
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possible causes of such emotional convergence and divergence. The
most interesting and systematic of these derive from empathy. But
despite their importance for social life, empathic influences on our
emotional and evaluative reactions are often regarded as irrational.
Broadly stated, the goal of this Article is to reconcile the idea that
emotions play a salutary role in evaluative thought with the
phenomenon of empathy.
It has been suggested by a number of writers over the years that
empathy is important as a precursor to and motivator of moral
behavior. By producing "emotional understanding" of the plight of
others, rather than mere "intellectual understanding," the suggestion
goes, empathy induces us to care about that plight, rather than ignore
it. There is, I think, something importantly correct about this idea of
empathy as a source of altruistic or "prosocial" motivation, though
articulating it is more delicate than has sometimes been thought. But
the useful project of exploring empathy's role in the motivation of
human action is already well under way, and I do not propose to
contribute further to it here. I I am interested in articulating a rather
different role for empathy; one that I think is equally interesting, if
somewhat more recondite.
This Article focuses on the epistemological function of empathy,
rather than its capacity to motivate-which is to say that I will
investigate empathy's role as a means of acquiring knowledge or
justified beliefs. One evident way in which empathy could be a source
of knowledge is by helping us find out how another person feels. By
empathizing with someone's feelings, one might come to know
something about how she feels that one didn't know before. 6 The
claim that empathy can produce such knowledge has been a
centerpiece of one central research tradition in the psychological and
philosophical literature on empathy: the "simulationist" or
"perspective-taking" approach. We will consider this approach to
empathy in some detail in what follows, along with an alternative
5. See generally DANIEL C. BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 126-27 (1991); Nancy Eisenberg, Values, Sympathy and Individual
Differences: Toward a Pluralism of Factors Influencing Altruism and Empathy, 2 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 121, 129-31 (1991); M.L. Hoffman, Is Altruism Part of Nature, J. PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOL. 121 (1981). See several of the contributions to NANCY EISENBERG & JANET
STRAYER, EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 4-6 (1987).
6. Whether or not empathy can confer such knowledge depends in part on how reliable its
mechanisms are in providing accurate information about the states of others. We will attend
further to this question in due course.
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model of empathy: the "contagion" model. I will not attempt to
defend the claim that either of these processes is sufficiently reliable
to produce knowledge. Rather, I want to suggest some further
consequences that might follow if they were tolerably reliable. I do
hope, by contrasting these mechanisms of empathic transmission, to
get clearer about how they might produce knowledge of other minds.
Ultimately, though, this discussion serves a rather different purpose.
I want to argue that empathy is not merely a device for acquiring
knowledge about the contents of other minds, it is a device for
learning about what matters and why. Some empathy plays a
distinctive and previously unrecognized role in the epistemology of
value by providing us with vicarious access to evaluative perspectives
different from our own.
I begin, in Section one, by briefly explaining some of the
important connections between emotions and values suggested above.
In Section two I address empathy, distinguishing it from sympathy,
and offering a general characterization of empathic mechanisms.
More detail is provided in Section three, where I develop accounts of
some specific empathic mechanisms, reviewing some recent research
on the subject. Finally, in Section four I ask how we should think
about empathic transmission, in light of the forgoing discussion. I
argue for what I take to be a surprising conclusion: the comparatively
unreflective and involuntary mechanisms of contagion serve a more
important role in evaluative thought than do the apparently more
rational procedures of simulation.
I.

EMOTION AND VALUE

There is plainly some deep intimacy between valuing things (or
thinking that they are valuable) and feeling certain sorts of emotional
responses to them. We commonly feel guilty when we have done
something wrong, ashamed of things we think shameful (or
contemptuous of them, in others), amused at what's funny, indignant
at injustice, and so on. When things lose their power to elicit any
emotional responses from us, it is natural to wonder whether we still
value them as we once did. But it is not obvious whether or how
these observations can be parlayed into general connections between
emotions and values (or disvalues -hereafter I intend talk of "value"
and "values" to include things with negative as well as positive value).
I want to focus attention on two connections between emotion and
value: one epistemological and the other conceptual. I do not aspire
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to establish the existence of these connections conclusively here, but I
hope to say enough to make them seem plausible as starting
assumptions.
The first assumption is that we are justified in according some
defeasible presumption of warrant to our emotional reactions. To
understand this suggestion, begin by noting that emotional reactions
are typically experienced as sensitivities to evaluative features of the
world. Unlike mere feelings (such as a tickle or an itch), emotions are
ways of taking things to matter. Because they purport to be
responses to some kind of value, emotions are amenable to forms of
rational assessment that mere feelings are not. In being amused, for
instance, we take ourselves to be reacting to something that is funny.
The assumption of warrant claims that, absent countervailing
considerations, we are entitled to count the fact that we are amused
by something as a reason to think it is funny. Similarly, if you felt
offended by someone's behavior, that is a reason for thinking it is
genuinely offensive. To grant our emotions this defeasible authority
is not trivial. One might suppose that just what it is for the joke to be
funny is for it to amuse you, and what it is for the behavior to be
offensive is for it to offend you. In that case it would be trivial that
we should grant authority to our reactions-and not merely
defeasible authority.
But a moment's reflection on cases of emotional error shows that
this conclusion would be hasty. After all, we sometimes admit that
we were mistaken or unjustified in being amused or offended by
something. I might have been amused because I was feeling giddy,
not because the joke was really funny. You might feel offended
because you are feeling defensive for independent reasons, and not
because the behavior that now bothers you is really offensive. So we
shouldn't take our emotional reactions as "proof" of the evaluative
features to which we take them to respond. My assumption is more
modest: it makes sense to accord some presumptive authority on
questions of value to our actual emotional reactions. These grounds
can be outweighed, or even utterly defeated, by competing
considerations that convince us to discount or disregard the
"testimony" of any given emotional reaction.
Giddiness or
defensiveness, for instance, would be an obvious example of such
competing considerations. But absent such further considerations, we
naturally and (I submit) reasonably take our reactions as reasons to
judge that something is funny, shameful, sad, and so on.
The second assumption is that, for a certain subset of our familiar
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evaluative categories, to think that something is valuable is to think
that certain emotional reactions to it are appropriate, in a special
sense of appropriate. Call this conception of the relationship between
emotion and certain values "sentimentalism." ' Most sentimentalists
believe that all evaluative concepts can be explained as assessments of
the appropriateness of emotional responses. I think that view is
overly optimistic. But there is an important range of values that seem
to carry an especially intimate tie to human emotional responses, and
for which sentimentalism seems the only plausible account. Consider,
for instance, the following concepts: shameful, fearsome, enviable,
disgusting, funny, and pitiful. These are clearly evaluative concepts. 8
Each seems to be affiliated with a specific and familiar emotional
response (in many cases the term for the concept is a cognate of the
name for such a response). For each of these concepts, I submit, to
think that something has the feature in question is to think that the
paired emotional response is appropriate. So to think something
funny is to think amusement appropriate, to think something
shameful is to think shame appropriate, and so on. 9
On the sentimentalist view, then, actually feeling the relevant
response is neither necessary nor sufficient for making the judgment.

7. Contemporary sentimentalists include ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE INETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 1-5 (1993); SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN QUASI-REALISM 15-17 (1993); SIMON
BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS 1-3 (1998); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS
36-38 (1990); John McDowell, Values and Secondary Properties, in MORALITY AND
OBJECTIVITY 110, 111 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985); and DAVID WIGGINS, A Sensible
Subjectivism, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 185, 185-87
(1987). There are important differences between these versions of sentimentalism which I will
largely ignore in the discussion that follows.
The view I favor is called "rational
sentimentalism," which aims to explicate the relevant notion of appropriateness in terms of a
"fit" between the emotion and the circumstances. Daniel Jacobson and I have been developing
this theory in recent collaborative work. Much of this section abbreviates arguments made in
this collaborative work. Philosophers take note that this view is not to be confused with
dispositionalism. Dispositionalist accounts of the concepts on which I focus here are untenable,
as we argue in Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, Sentiment and Value, in ETHICS
(forthcoming).
8. If this be doubted, consider that to apply any of these concepts to something is to
consider it good or bad in some respect. More specifically, they are apparently "thick"
evaluative concepts, in that they serve not only to praise or condemn, but also to describe. Cf
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 129-30 (1985). Also, each of
them seems to supply one with reasons: reasons to feel, at least, and perhaps to act as well.
Thus, if one thinks a trait shameful, for instance, one thinks its bearer has a reason to be
ashamed of it, and one may well think he has a reason to eliminate or conceal it, too.
9. What's the alternative? Can it seriously be supposed that there is some property "the
disgusting" or "the funny" that one can understand and attribute to things without thereby
involving oneself in judgments about the appropriateness of amusement or disgust? What
property might this be, and by what means would we hope to discover its contours?
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One can feel ashamed of a trait while thinking the trait isn't really
shameful. This would be to think that the shame one is feeling is
inappropriate. (Think of a gay teenager who is convinced that he
shouldn't be ashamed of his sexual orientation, but can't help feeling
that way, at least in certain company.) One can also judge something
disgusting without always mustering the disgust that one thereby
deems appropriate. (Think of a detective who has been searching the
dumpster for clues long enough that he has become inured to the
stench-he might still think that this is a disgusting task.) But the
sentimentalist claims it would be a mistake to conclude from the
possibility of such differences between judgment and response that
the relevant values are independent of our emotional susceptibilities.
Rather, the point of these evaluative concepts is to focus our thought
about what things do and do not merit feelings of this kind in order to
regulate these feelings in accordance with norms that make sense of
them. 10 So we have these concepts because we have these responses
and a capacity to reflect on them. Nothing would count as a genuine
application of such a concept unless it involved an endorsement (of
the relevant sort) of having the paired emotional response. Call the
evaluative concepts that possess this especially intimate sort of
connection to emotional responses "response-dependent concepts."
The second assumption, then, amounts to the claim that some
evaluative concepts are response-dependent in this sense.
The two assumptions are independent claims; but they interact.
The presumption of warrant for our emotional reactions is most
plausible with respect to response-dependent concepts. After all,
thought about what things have value must begin somewhere, and
surely when the values in question are response-dependent, it begins
with our actual responses." But the first assumption applies more
widely as well: whenever an emotion presents itself as a sensitivity to
some aspect of the circumstances, it makes sense to accord it an initial
presumption of warrant. "Taking offense" (or "feeling offended"),
for instance, is a familiar emotional reaction that often precedes or
follows upon a judgment that one has been mistreated in some way.
It may be to some extent culturally idiosyncratic- its nature
determined in part by particular conceptions of what kind of
10. This way of putting the point, and indeed much of the surrounding discussion, is
indebted to GIBBARD, supra note 7, at 55-57.
11. Both GIBBARD, supra note 7, and Wiggins, supra note 7, make use of speculations
about the origins of our evaluative concepts in the sentiments, though in quite different ways.
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treatment is due to people and why. It may be that, for this reason,

"mistreatment" is not helpfully regarded as a response-dependent
concept in the sense above-the response itself already presupposes
the concept it would be invoked to explain. 12 Still, one way in which
we come to regard someone as having mistreated us is through feeling
offended, and then finding, upon reflection, that we think these

feelings are appropriate.

Much the same could be said of many

evaluative judgments: we are sometimes led to make them by having

an involuntary emotional response (of a more or less basic sort) to
something, and finding this response reasonable upon reflection.

Deciding what is good or bad, praiseworthy or objectionable in
various ways is often a matter of having various emotional reactions
and reflecting on their appropriateness.
"Evaluative inquiry" is inquiry into what has value.13 Much of
this inquiry, I've been suggesting, naturally arises out of emotional

reactions and our reflection on their appropriateness.

In feeling

ashamed of something, we "feel as though" it were shameful. 4 In
asking whether it really is shameful, we take a critical distance from
our immediate reactions and question the evaluative convictions they
urge upon us. Such questions, though, should not typically be
understood as asking about the justification of evaluative convictions
as against nihilism or skepticism about values. Evaluative inquiry
typically proceeds against the background assumption that some
things are and others aren't shameful (funny, lewd, wrong, beautiful,

important, etc.). The task of this inquiry is to decide which things
12. Sentimentalists disagree about whether emotions must be prior to the responsedependent concepts they are invoked to explain. I cannot address that question here.
13. All this talk of values in the world, of emotions being appropriate or making mistakes
about these values, and, in general, of reflection on questions of value can sound naively
realistic about claims whose objective status is, to say the least, problematic. But I can't enter
here into debates about whether there really are truths or facts about value; and I do not think
any such discussion is required. The fact is that we all routinely talk about what is and isn't
funny, shameful, enviable, disgusting, etc. We sometimes allow that things are funny despite
our failing to muster the relevant emotional response, or that they aren't really funny even
though we find ourselves amused. Thinking and talking in such terms are so central to human
experience and social life that it is difficult to see how we could proceed without them. So, any
philosophical conclusions we might reach about the status of such thought would have to leave
us room to continue engaging in it as emotional participants in an evaluative life, even if we
rejected it as theorists. In recent years, even philosophers who doubt whether there are truths
about value, or who suspect that all evaluative judgments are in error, have recognized a need to
leave a role for judgments about value in our discursive practices. Cf. BLACKBURN, supra note
7, at 15-17; GIBBARD, supra note 7, at 81-83; JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS, INVENTING RIGHT AND
WRONG 15-17 (1977).
14. See GREENSPAN, supra note 1, at 148.
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have which features. The kind of justification we aim for in such
evaluative inquiry is best understood as relative to a contrast class
that includes competing evaluative convictions, but does not include

(and hence does not purport to answer) thorough-going skepticism or
nihilism.1
This refusal to regard evaluative inquiry as inevitably attempting

(unsuccessfully) to refute skepticism about value should not lead us to
evaluative complacency, however. As agents with choices to make,
we still want and need to reflect upon which things are valuable in
various ways. An important part of that reflection will involve having
and assessing the appropriateness of various emotional reactions.

These emotional reactions can make better or worse sense in light of
our other evaluative commitments, our views about our reasons for
acting in various ways, and our wider patterns of emotional reaction.
In some cases, we deem our reactions inappropriate because of their

failure to fit with these wider evaluative convictions. In other cases,
though, emotional experience can initiate a change in those other
convictions. When we find ourselves persistently feeling emotions
that do not line up with our considered views, we are inclined to
revisit and sometimes revise those views.16 This role for emotional

experience is important not only negatively, as a corrective to
evaluative convictions we come to see as mistaken, but also positively,

as a source of input that can expand our system of convictions to
make a place for new sources of value and interest. For example,
many people find that responding emotionally to nonhuman animals
leads them to what they see as an improved appreciation of ethical
considerations concerning the treatment of animals. By reacting
emotionally, they are led to see new sources or kinds of value in

animal lives. 7
15. This line of approach to the epistemology of value is developed by Walter SinnottArmstrong, Moral Skepticism and Justification, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE 3, 14-17, 20-25 (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons eds., 1996), to which I am indebted.
16. Of course the mere fact of persistence does not establish that the reactions are to be
accommodated, rather than discounted. Sometimes even persistent emotional reactions are
best regarded as errors to be resisted. But in a reasonably healthy psychology, persistent
emotional recalcitrance is often grounds for evaluative reform. Note that sometimes the best
conclusion is that the reaction is appropriate, in the sense that the circumstance really is funny,
shameful, etc., but that other evaluative features of the situation are more important for
determining how to respond, or (especially) how to act.
17. Again, the point is not that all such changes are improvements in ethical sensibility.
Perhaps some are and some are not. The point is rather to recognize the ways in which
emotional reactions offer new inputs into evaluative reflection.
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So far my emphasis has been largely on how individuals attempt
to integrate emotional reactions with more reflective forms of
evaluative thought. But my interest in empathy arises in part from
the conviction that social influences on our reactions play an
important role in determining how we feel. If, as I've been saying,
how we feel plays an important role in evaluative inquiry, then social
influences on our reactions turn out to have wide evaluative
significance. Inquiry and reflection are often discussed as though
they were activities an individual undertakes alone: the traditional
paragons of intellectual virtue are Descartes and Holmes, uncovering
the truth through pure reason. But while the model of rigorous
independent thinking has attractions, of course it is largely
mythological-especially with respect to evaluative subject matters.
On questions of value collective deliberation is the norm: we test our
own emotional reactions by comparing them with other people's. We
argue and remonstrate, concede and retrench, hoping to influence
one another, but ultimately aiming to achieve some kind of
convergence in evaluative judgment. Sometimes logic and broader
forms of coherence win the day, but sometimes they give ground to
widely shared, emotionally grounded conviction. There are a few
evaluative iconoclasts, of course. But for almost all of us, finding a
sustainable set of evaluative convictions requires integrating one's
commitments into a community of sufficiently like-minded thinkers.
This is hardly surprising, since much of the point of evaluation is to
find standards that will govern us in social lives we must live together.
But it is all too common to regard the reasons for giving some ground
to others as merely pragmatic, and to suppose that the search for the
truth should proceed by attempting to abstract away from such
influences. The view I am urging is rather different. Though we must
and do accord a special authority to our own sensibilities,
nonetheless, to the extent that we take seriously the idea that
emotional reactions can do better and worse at responding to the
values that things have, we must acknowledge the possibility that our
own reactions might be improved, rather than always degraded,
through the influence of others. 18
As beings who are capable of valuing and (sometimes) acting in
18. Of course, it is sometimes reasonable to reject such influences, for instance when we
have an explanation of the others' different reactions which give us grounds for thinking that
they, rather than we, are in error. But absent any such story, we have no grounds for according
fundamental authority only to our own reactions. Cf GIBBARD, supra note 7, at 171-203.
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accordance with what we value, we are naturally interested in
deciding what is worth valuing (i.e., what is valuable). Although I
have been saying that we do and should accord some prima facie
warrant to our own reactions and those of other people, we must also
countenance the possibility that these reactions are mistaken, perhaps
even systematically so. But how then can we decide which of our
reactions to trust, except by appeal to other evaluative convictions
which may themselves be misguided? To what extent should we trust
our actual emotional tendencies as guides to what is valuable and
disvaluable? I do not believe that there is any general answer to
these questions. But I will broach (without attempting to defend
them here) three principles which seem sufficiently robust to deserve
our allegiance, unless and until we find better. First, in general, the
more nonevaluative knowledge a person has about a circumstance,
the more reason there is to trust her emotional reactions as guides to
evaluation. Second, in general, our emotional reactions are more
trustworthy to the extent that they are informed by a wider range of
life experience. For instance, having occupied different positions with
respect to a given type of situation gives one better reason to trust
one's reactions than one has when one has only held an advantaged
or disadvantaged position. Third, in general, our reactions are more
reliable to the extent that they are formed in light of interaction and
communal reflection with other evaluating agents.
With these general observations about value and emotion in
place, I turn to a discussion of empathy. The goal is to clarify the
notion of empathy with which I am working, and then to explain its
operations. In the final section we will mobilize the forgoing
considerations about the relation between emotion and value to
explore empathy's role in evaluative inquiry.
II. WHAT IS EMPATHY?

Though "empathy" is a relatively recent term in English, it has
already become ambiguous. One source of this ambiguity is its
unclear relation to "sympathy" - itself a term with numerous
meanings. 19 "Empathy" entered our language early in this century as
19. A helpful, though tendentious, discussion of the relation between empathy and
sympathy can be found in Douglas Chismar, Empathy and Sympathy: The Important Difference,
in 22 J. VALUE INQUIRY 257, 257-66 (1988). On that account, to empathize is to respond to
another's perceived emotional state by experiencing feelings of a similar sort. Sympathy
includes empathizing, but entails also having a positive regard or a non-fleeting concern for the
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a translation of the German term Einfiihlung.20 That word was used
in German aesthetics to refer to a postulated kind of response to art,
in which one first engages in some involuntary bodily mimicry of the
work, then projects onto it an emotional response that somehow fits
with one's acquired bodily posture. Theodor Lipps eventually came
to think the phenomenon could occur in interpersonal cases as well,
when people come through unconscious mimicry of another's
behavior to feel some emotional response that they then project onto
the observed subject. 21 This is the basis for the most familiar
contemporary sense of the term "empathy" (a sense we will presently
seek to sharpen), on which to empathize is to react to the perceived
feelings of another with vicarious emotional reactions of one's own,
and empathy is the capacity for, or the occurrence of, such a vicarious
experience.
"Sympathy" is a much older term, and has a number of rather
different meanings.
It was widely used by eighteenth-century
philosophers such as Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam
Smith (the so-called "British Moralists") to refer both to mechanisms
of empathy (including some like those considered by Lipps) and to
various feelings and benevolent motives that those mechanisms can
produce. 22 This ambiguity persists in contemporary use. In order to
distinguish between what are clearly distinct phenomena, I will use
"sympathy" here in a more restrictive sense as the name for the kind
of sentiment that responds to perceived harms or threats to another
person with concern for that person, and involves some degree of
motivation to aid the person. 23 In effect, I am treating sympathy as
another name for pity, though the term lacks the connotations of
condescension that are frequently associated with "pity." A fuller
treatment would have to take account of the wide variety of other
phenomena that are sometimes called "sympathetic." On my way of
other person. Neither of these characterizations seems wholly satisfactory, for reasons set forth
above.
20. According to Steven Darwall, Empathy, Sympathy, Care, 89 PHIL. STUD. 261 (1998),
the first usage of 'empathy' in our language was in 1909 when Edward Titchener coined it to
translate Theodor Lipps's use of Einfiihlung.
21. THEODOR LIPPS, Empathy and Aesthetic Pleasure, in AESTHETIC STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ART 403, 409-11 (Karl Aschenbrenner & Arnold Isenberg eds., 1965).
22. A thorough discussion of more recent psychological work on sympathy is LAUREN
WIsPt, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMPATHY 58-61 (1991).
23. This view of sympathy is largely in line with those of Douglas Chismar, supra note 19,
and Steven Darwall, supra note 20, at 262-63, 272-79. Both of those authors treat sympathy in
more detail than I can here.
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using the terms, sympathy is not only not the same thing as empathy,
it is not the same kind of thing: sympathy is an emotion, empathy is a
way of acquiring an emotion. 24
Granting the distinction, though, is there any reason to suppose
that empathy will always lead to sympathy? 5 If empathy is
understood, as above, as a vicarious experience of an observed
subject's emotional reactions, then presumably the answer is no-or
not directly, in any case. Sympathy is essentially a third-personal
feeling, so it makes no sense to suppose that the observer vicariously
experiences sympathy that the distressed person (the model) is
feeling. The model isn't feeling sympathy, but sadness, or fear, or
distress, etc. Still, even if empathy does not directly induce sympathy,
it certainly can set the stage for sympathy. After acquiring vicarious
sadness through empathy, one is primed to feel sympathy for a
bereaved person toward whom one was initially unsympathetic.
Indeed, there is surely some plausibility to the thought that any
vicarious emotional experience, taken up as if from the perspective
of another, makes one somewhat more likely to be interested in the
other person -though it is a further question whether this will lead to
concern for that person's well-being. Michael Stocker and Stephen
Darwall both seem to deny this, going so far as to claim that empathy
or empathic understanding of another person is consistent with the
detachment of scientific observation ("or even the cruelty of sadism,"
Darwall adds). 26 They claim that whether empathy leads to sympathy
depends upon why one is interested in the other person. No doubt
this will be a relevant factor, and no doubt it is possible to empathize
without ever coming to sympathize. But it is worth noting that if
empathy entails (or even typically involves) feeling another's
emotional reaction vicariously, "empathic understanding" will never
(or not typically) be detached or indifferent in the way that pure
observation is.27

24. Cf Darwall, supra note 20, at 263 (1998) ("Sympathy for a person and her plight is felt
as from the third-person perspective of one-caring, whereas empathy involves something like a
sharing of the other's mental states, frequently, as from her standpoint.").
25. An excellent discussion of recent literature concerning the relation between certain
forms of empathy and altruistic motivation can be found in Shaun Nichols, Mindreading and the
Core Architecture of Moral Psychology (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. See STOCKER & HEGEMAN, supra note 2, at 214-217; Darwall, supra note 20, at 261.
27. See Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85 (1993), for an
interesting discussion of the relationship between full appreciation of another person's
circumstances and sympathy or concern for that person.
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Now to attempt the promised sharpening of the concept of
empathy. My primary concern is with mechanisms of empathy, which
I define as mechanisms that tend to influence the emotional reactions
of one person-the "observer"-so as to or produce a match
(roughly, some sort of congruence) between these emotions and those
of another person-the "model." To say that someone is empathizing
with someone, then, is to say that she is being influenced by some
such mechanism. Whether there are such mechanisms, and if so, how
they operate, are matters for empirical investigation. I discuss the
results of some relevant research in Section three. In any case, all
discussion of empathy in what follows will be focused on empathy
that is postulated to arise from some such mechanism. Several
features of this approach should be explained and defended.
My definition focuses on mechanisms of empathy in order to
highlight the point that an actual match is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the occurrence of the phenomena that have generally
been of interest to researchers who have taken themselves to be
studying "empathy." It is not sufficient because an emotional match
between model and observer might occur by chance, without the
operations of any psychological process that even tends to bring
about such matches. My account avoids calling such accidents cases
of empathy.28 If we know that Bob and Carolyn are each angry about
the actions of Congress, and that Bob saw Carolyn getting angry
before he got angry himself, we surely need to know more to establish
whether Bob is empathizing with Carolyn's anger or getting angry
about the same thing independently. So a match, even a match
preceded by observation of another party's reaction, is not sufficient
for empathy.
A match is also not necessary for empathy on the proffered
account. This is in order to countenance the possibility that genuine
instances of the psychological processes we are exploring may fail, on
any given occasion, to produce a "match" of the relevant sort.
Suppose Melanie finds herself feeling sad in the presence of Mark
(whose brother has recently died) and that her feeling sad is a result
28. It might be thought that this problem of accidental matches is better treated by adding
a causal requirement. One could say that empathy occurs whenever a model's emotional
reaction induces a matching emotional reaction in the observer. But if this conception were
adopted, then simulation or perspective taking would turn out not to be empathy. This would
be an intolerably revisionary result, in light of the paradigmatic role that simulation has played
in the scientific study of empathy. Simulation will receive considerable discussion in what
follows.
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of psychological mechanisms that are responsive to Mark's expressive
behavior and that tend to bring about matches between the model
and the observer. Suppose, though, that (for reasons we need not
specify) Mark is actually not sad about the death of his brother, but
relieved. Is Melanie empathizing with Mark or not? Ordinary usage
may not be sufficiently determinate to favor either answer; but in
sharpening the concept, I want to emerge with a conception of
empathy that is informed by empirical study and scientific theorizing
as well as ordinary usage. On my account we will say that this is a
case of empathy, albeit misfiring empathy. The benefits of this
approach in accommodating the science of empathy will become
evident in the next section, which surveys recent psychological
accounts of empathic mechanisms.
The relation of a "match" between emotional states is intended
to be broader than the more traditional suggestion that empathy
produces the same emotion in the observer as is experienced in the
model.29 One reason for preferring this wider notion is that, on a
number of views, the emotional experiences of an empathizer are not
actually genuine instances of the same emotion as the model is
30
experiencing- they are imaginary emotions, or quasi-emotions.
Thus it has been claimed that you are not literally afraid when you
empathize with the plight of the person you see in grave danger
(perhaps because to be afraid is to feel endangered and/or inclined to
fight or flee, and you don't have these attitudes). But even if the
emotion you feel is different than the one the model feels, there may
be important points of correspondence between them. For instance,
it may be that both are unpleasant experiences focused on some
source of threat to the model, and both involve viewing that source in
a negative light precisely as a threat to the model. There may even be
some correspondence in physiological symptoms between these
states. Then, I will want to say, we have a match in the (admittedly
31
vague) sense I am using.
29. Here I follow Barnett and allied theorists who require only that the emotion in the
observer be "congruent with" that in the model, rather than identical. See, e.g., Mark Barnett,
Empathy and Related Responses in Children, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 157, 157-62
(Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987) (and literature cited there). The remarks here
about the notion of a match might help to flesh out the relevant sense of 'congruence.'
30. See, e.g., Kendall L. Walton, FearingFictions, 75 J. PHIL. 5 (1978).
31. Daniel McIntosh et al., Socially Induced Affect, in LEARNING, REMEMBERING,
BELIEVING: ENHANCING HUMAN PERFORMANCE 251, 252-53 (Daniel Druckman & Robert A.
Bjork eds., 1994), distinguishes between "concordant" and "discordant" cases in which an
observer's emotional experience is "induced by" a model's observable emotions or feelings.
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Finally, my definition appeals to mechanisms that tend to

influence one person's emotions so as to produce a match between
them and another person's emotions. This "so as" is ambiguous in a
way that invites us to ask, but does not prejudge, the question of
whether it is the function of the mechanisms in question to produce
such matches, or whether that is merely their effect. Whether the

capacity for empathy has a selective history of the sort that might
make it an adaptation is an interesting question. Further discussion
will demonstrate some ways in which empathy might be important for
our capacity to understand and predict each other's behavior-a
capacity which is obviously important to our social lives, and hence to

our fitness. And many psychologists believe that there are a host of
different mechanisms underlying empathy, including some redundant
systems. This superabundance of mechanisms provides some reason

for thinking that the capacity for empathy has adaptive significance:
where several complex, costly systems produce the same effect, and

that effect has an important impact on the organism's fitness, there is
a prima facie reason to posit evolutionary function. It seems plausible
to me that some empathic mechanisms are adaptations, but I will not
attempt to argue for that claim here, since none of what follows

depends upon this suggestion.
III.

MECHANISMS OF EMPATHY

The richest historical discussions of the mechanisms of empathy
are David Hume's and Adam Smith's treatments of what they called
"sympathy." These authors had rather different ideas about its
operation.
In the last thirty years, developmental and social
psychologists have been exploring the mechanisms of empathy in
considerable detail, and the reality of the phenomenon is by now well
documented in a number of experiments. 32
Interestingly,
Concordant cases are those where the model and the observer experience affect with the same
valence (positive or negative), and discordant cases are those where the valences are opposed. I
intend the notion of a match to require more than just concordance, including, at least, a
common intentional focus in the two parties' emotions. I leave deliberately unsettled whether
socially induced cases of discordant affect could ever be counted as a match, and hence whether
such cases will ever properly be called instances of "empathy." That question, it seems to me,
may be best decided by the fruitfulness of the different possible extensions of the term
"empathy" within psychological research programs. Accordingly, the acknowledged vagueness
in the definition of a "match" is principled, and not careless.
32. For a review of such research, see id. at 254; Bert S. Moore, The Origins and
Development of Empathy, 14 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 75, 75-79 (1990).
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contemporary research into specific mechanisms of empathy has led
psychologists toward two distinct paradigms, contagion and
simulation, suggested respectively by the work of Hume and Smith.
In this Section, I explain and draw some distinctions between these
two forms of empathy.
"'The human countenance"' says Hume 3 (quoting approvingly
from Horace), "'borrows smiles or tears from the human
Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all
countenance.'
enjoyment.., because the movements of his heart are not forwarded
by correspondent movements in his fellow creatures." This is one of
the things Hume meant by "sympathy," the curious empathic
phenomenon in which an emotional state is transmitted from model
to observer. It is a "propensity we have to sympathize with others,
and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments,
however different from, or even contrary to, our own." 34 This aspect
of sympathy 35 is important for Hume's account of moral motivation,
since he thinks it serves as a partial explanation of the other kind of
sympathy: benevolent concern for the well-being of others, aroused
36
through vicarious experiences of their pleasures and pains.
The quote from Horace, and some of the other remarks Hume
makes about empathy (as we will anachronistically call it), suggest a
view of empathy as an involuntary "catching" of another's emotion,
induced somehow by the model's expressive behavior. Recent
scholarship refers to this sort of process as "contagion." What is
striking about this kind of empathy, which the epidemiological
metaphor highlights, is the apparently noncognitive nature of the
mechanism. It seems that without any reflection on what state the
model is in, indeed without conscious awareness that he is attending
to the model's state at all, an observer can find himself feeling an
emotion that matches the model's. Following these strands in
33.

DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 54 (Open

Court Pub. Co. 1930) (1777).
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 316 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896).
35. Contagion is only one of the things that Hume treats under the rubric of sympathy. In
other contexts, the term refers to other aspects of our "natural" tendency to respond
emotionally to others. Recent discussions of Hume on sympathy have tended to focus on these
other aspects. See generally ANNETTE BAIER, A PROGRESS OF SENTIMENTS (1991).
36. Though Hume expressly disavows the search for any explanatory principles more basic
than the tendency of persons to take pleasure and pain at the pleasure and pain of others, he
also thinks we can infer a concern with the causes of emotional expressions (i.e., with good and
bad behavior) from the fact that we are moved by the expressions themselves. See HUME, supra
note 33, at 54 n.1.
34.
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Hume's thought, we will treat him as holding a noncognitive,

contagion theory of empathy (though other strands pull in other
directions) .3 Recent research on empathy not only confirms the
existence of such contagion, but traces its causes to just the
mechanism that Hume and Horace suggest--an unreflective transfer
of emotional expressions from model to observer.

In fact, the best understood mechanism of contagion seems to
run through mimicry, particularly mimicry of facial expression.
Mimicry is a phylogenetically ancient phenomenon, playing an
important developmental and social role in many animal species,

including humans. Early in development, infants engage in mimicry.

One familiar example is contagious crying in a nursery.3 8 Among

human adults, facial mimicry in particular is extremely common, and
is often involuntary. Dimberg showed observers slides of posed angry

and happy faces. 39 Using electromyographs to measure muscular
activity, he found that activity of the zygomatic muscle (used to pull

back the cheeks when smiling) was high in observers of happy faces,
and that activity of the corrugator muscle (used to wrinkle the brows)
was high in observers of angry faces. Berger and Hadley recorded
muscular activity in the arms and lips of observers watching armwrestling and stuttering videotapes, finding higher levels of activity in
the observers' muscles corresponding to the muscles being used by

the models n° On a lighter note, Zajonc and his colleagues found

empirical support for the folk adage that old couples look alike, and
they argue that this is best explained by repeated mimicry of each
other's facial expressions over many years. 41 Other studies confirm

the general phenomenon: consciously or unconsciously, observers
37. At various points Hume suggests a more cognitive picture, according to which the
observer forms an idea of the emotion the model is experiencing as a result of observing her
expressions, and it is this idea of the model's emotion that somehow causes the emotion itself to
occur in the observer. See Robert Gordon, Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator,
in 105 ETHICS 727, 727-29 (1995). Gordon points out some of the difficulties with this picture.
One such difficulty is that requiring that contagion be mediated through beliefs makes it hard to
explain how infants could acquire emotions contagiously without attributing implausibly rich
cognitive capacities to them. See id.
38. See Janet Strayer, Children's Concordant Emotions and Cognitions in Response to
Observed Emotions, 64 CHILD DEV. 188, 188-201(1993).
39. See Ulf Dimberg, Facial Reactions to Facial Expressions, 19 J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
645, 645-46 (1982); Ulf Dimberg, Facial Electromyography and the Experience of Emotion, 56 J.
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 277, 277-88 (1988).
40. Seymour M. Berger & Suzanne W. Hadley, Some Effects of a Model's Performanceon
an Observer's ElectromyographicActivity, 88 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 273 (1975).
41. R. B. Zajonc et al., Convergence in the Physical Appearance of Spouses, 11
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 335,335 (1987).
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their
frequently mimic the behavior of models -particularly
42
expressive facial behavior.
Of course, that observers mimic the facial gestures of models
does not by itself show that observers experience the emotions that
are "expressed" by these gestures in the model. But there is
Other studies show that
substantial evidence that they do.
electrodermal responses, changes in heart rate, and changes in selfreported feelings are all correlated with models' expressive facial
behavior. 43 Furthermore, these correlations are not independent of
mimicry. Vaughan, Lanzetta, Bush, and others found that observers
asked to inhibit their own facial activity experienced less empathic
affect, and had diminished changes in heart rate and electrodermal
activity compared with those who were given no instructions.
Vaughan and Lanzetta also found that observers asked to adopt facial
expressions corresponding to those of the model experienced greater
changes in skin conductance and heart rates.
How can this be? How can facial gestures we think of as
expressions of underlying emotional states actually cause the very
states we take them to express? 44 Recent studies suggest that it may
be a product of "feedback," the phenomenon whereby facial and
other gestures cause internal changes that constitute or themselves
cause emotions. Eschewing the term "expression" for its obvious
presuppositions about the direction of causal influence, Robert
Zajonc and some others have begun to investigate facial "efference":
facial gestures which produce internal changes through a kind of
feedback. Ekman instructed actors to form their muscles, one by one,
into six "basic" emotional expressions. They reported dramatic
changes in heart rate varying with the nature of the actors' facial
movements, even though the actors' task was not described to them in
terms of emotional expressions. Lest it be thought nonetheless that
the actors performed the facial task by attempting to call up particular
emotions, Zajonc, Murphy and Inglehart performed a similar
experiment, putatively about phonetic research. They instructed
42. A useful survey is described in McIntosh et al., supra note 31.
43. A useful survey is described in Pamela K. Adelman & R. B. Zajonc, Facial Efference
and the Experience of Emotion, 40 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 249, 273 (1989).
44. Carl Georg Lange and William James notoriously held that the bodily disturbances
commonly thought to be effects of emotions were in fact their causes. CARL GEORG LANGE &
WILLIAM JAMES, THE EMOTIONS 5-6, 13 (1922). But that view hasn't attracted many
contemporary adherents. For an astute critical discussion, see ROBERT GORDON, THE
STRUCTURE OF EMOTION 86-88 (1987).
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subjects to make particular vowel sounds, the making of which in fact
requires facial configurations akin to smiling and frowning. Subjects
were found (based on self-reports) to prefer feelings generated by

making the vowel sounds requiring a smiling expression to those
generated by making the sounds requiring the frowning one.
Additional studies by these and other researchers contribute to a
large body of data that demonstrates that facial efference can both
initiate and modulate emotional experience. 45 While the details and
explanation of these phenomena remain controversial, 46 it seems clear

that the combination of (facial) mimicry and feedback is one
mechanism by which emotional contagion occurs.
One possible shortcoming of contagion is a limitation on the
range of emotional experiences whose transmission it might plausibly
explain. Hume invoked it primarily to describe how pleasures or
pains in a model might be transferred to an observer. The recent
research just canvassed extends the theory to cover transmission of

any emotions with distinctive expressive physiologies through
feedback. But these "basic emotions" still represent a fairly narrow
span of emotional states: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and
disgust, according to the best-developed research program on basic

emotions.4 7 For those who wish to make more fine-grained
distinctions among types of emotion by appealing to different sorts of
beliefs and commitments that these emotions involve, contagion may
appear an impoverished account of empathic transmission. Thus, for

instance, it may be that contagion is incapable of distinguishing
45. See Harald G. Wallbott, Recognition of Emotion from Facial Expression Via Direct
Imitation?: Some Indirect Evidence for an Old Theory, 30 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 207, 207
(1991); see also Adelman & Zajonc, supra note 43.
46. The only functional explanation I am aware of for the facial feedback phenomenon is
Zajonc's updated version of a theory originally proposed by the turn-of-the-century physician
Israel Waynbaum, who suggested that facial gestures permit regulation of blood flow to the
brain. See R. B. Zajonc, Emotion and Facial Efference: A Theory Reclaimed, 228 SCIENCE 15,
15-21 (1985); cf., DEAN FALK, BRAINDANCE 155-59 (1992). Zajonc argues that this vascular
theory is largely correct, though the true function of these facial movements is control of brain
blood temperature, rather than blood supply. See Zajonc, supra, at 15-21. He makes a
compelling case, the truth of which I feel ill equipped to assess. It is worth noting, though, that
the enormous importance of maintaining appropriate brain temperature has been the focus of at
least one recent account of the extraordinary evolution of the hominid brain. See id.
47. See PAUL EKMAN, THE FACE OF MAN: EXPRESSIONS OF UNIVERSAL EMOTIONS INA
NEW GUINEA VILLAGE (1980). I suspect that further research will ultimately expand the list of
pancultural emotional syndromes to include some (such as shame) that are now typically
regarded as culturally idiosyncratic. But it should be granted that ordinary thought, with its
cognitive sharpenings of various emotional states, has far more emotional categories than our
bodies have distinctive emotional phenotypes.
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between (i.e., transmitting just the appropriate one of) anger, moral
indignation, and social offense.
If the above difficulty for contagion is correctly diagnosed as
arising from cognitive distinctions among different kinds of emotional
reaction, the solution might be a more cognitive account of empathy.
Adam Smith developed a theory of sympathy that made room for a
far greater repertoire of empathetic feelings. He also held that "we
can form no idea of the manner in which [other men] are affected, but
by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation." It
is through imaginatively projecting ourselves into another's position,
and then introspecting to see how those circumstances make us feel,
that we gain any empathic appreciation of the feelings of others. This
is the simulation theory of empathy. Much of the recent psychological work on empathy has taken simulation (or "perspective-taking,"
or "role-taking" as it is sometimes called) as the paradigmatic
48
empathic process.
The simulation theory has recently been defended by several

influential philosophers and psychologists as a general account of our
capacity to attribute mental states to others, and to predict their
behavior. 9 The general thought is that, in order to work out what
someone else believes, desires, or feels, and hence, ultimately, what
she is likely to do, we imaginatively enter into her position, and then
see what we find ourselves imaginatively believing, desiring, or

feeling. That is, we run our own belief-forming (or desire-forming, or
emotion-forming) processes "off-line," using imaginary inputs that
appropriately resemble the circumstances of our model, then we
attribute to the model the real counterpart to whatever imaginary

state emerges from this simulation in us.50 While some details vary
between accounts, contemporary simulationists are united in
48. A useful survey is described in Janet Strayer, Affective and Cognitive Perspectives on
Empathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT (Eisenberg & Strayer eds., 1987).
49. Among the prominent defenders of this view are Alvin I. Goldman, In Defense of the
Simulation Theory, 7 MIND & LANGUAGE 104, 104 (1992); Robert M. Gordon, Folk Psychology
as Simulation, 1 MIND & LANGUAGE 158 (1986), reprinted in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: THE
THEORY OF MIND DEBATE 60, 70 (Martin Davies & Tony Stone eds., 1995); and Paul L. Harris,
From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case for Development, 7 MIND & LANGUAGE 120,
120 (1992).
50. Smith's reference to "conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation" is
ambiguous here. In simulating King George's feelings at the coronation, am I to imagine how I
(Justin D'Arms) would feel if crowned King of England, or imagine being him, being crowned?
Contemporary simulationists prefer the latter description, which stands a better chance of
producing a matching reaction. I, after all, would be astonished to be crowned King of England.
George presumably was not.
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accepting these broad outlines, and in seeing this account as an
alternative to the more traditional "theory theory" of mental state
attribution. The "theory theory" holds that the capacity to attribute
mental states to other people (and to predict their behavior in light of
these attributions) involves nothing more than the application of a
(perhaps tacit) theory of mind, or "folk psychology." In particular,
such attribution does not require a simulation of the target's
circumstances." This theory is offered as an account of mental state
attribution, not an account of empathy. I mention it here because the
opposition between it and the simulation theory will be useful in
clarifying the simulationist's position about empathy.
Like Smith, modern defenders of simulation as an account of
empathy have occasionally made an overly extravagant claim for it:
that it is the sole effective mechanism of empathic transmission.12 But
a simulationist need not make so strong a claim. Hoffman, for
instance, defends a pluralistic view of empathic mechanisms.13 He has
found evidence supporting a model of child development in which the
capacity to imaginatively place oneself in another's shoes is a discrete
stage in the development of "prosocial" behavior, following after the
development of several distinct noncognitive capacities. One
significant, if unsurprising, finding is that once infants develop a
conception of others as distinct from themselves, the character of
their empathic responses becomes more complex. Rather than
merely experiencing distress at the presence of distressed models,
they begin responding with a range of feelings appropriate to the
model's situation. In adult simulations, the range of possible
experiences for empathic transmission is presumably broader still,
since adults typically possess both a more nuanced repertoire of
cognitive-cum-affective responses and a more sophisticated ability to
51. See, e.g., Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols, Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit
Theory?, 7 MIND & LANGUAGE 35 (1992), reprinted in FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49 at
123). Many of the relevant articles in the debate between simulationists and theory theorists are
collected in two books edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone: FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 49, and MENTAL SIMULATION (1995).
52. See, e.g., ALBERT BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 196-99
(1969); Ezra Stotland, Exploratory Investigations of Empathy, in ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1969). Defenders of simulation as a general account of
mental state attribution tend to be more ecumenical, holding that simulation is simply one
(perhaps especially important) means by which we are able to attribute such states to others.
53. Martin Hoffman, Empathy, Role-Taking, Guilt and Development of Altruistic Motives,
in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (Lickona ed., 1976); Martin Hoffman, Interaction of
Affect and Cognition in Empathy, in EMOTIONS, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR (R. B. Zajonc et
al. eds., 1984).
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think our way into another's circumstances. It appears then, that the
cognitive/imaginative operations of simulation permit transmission of
more finely grained emotional responses than does contagion.
To decide whether this appearance is misleading, let's consider
contagion in a little more detail. As described so far, contagion has
an important shortcoming. Its workings may explain the transmission
of an emotion from one party to another, but they do not yet explain
the correspondence in the intentional focus of that emotion, which I
suggested earlier is a requirement for generating a match between the
observer's and model's emotions. If Bob catches Carolyn's fear by
first mimicking her expressions unconsciously and then acquiring fear
by efferent feedback, it is not yet clear how his emotion could come
to match hers in the sense of being fear about the same thing. There
are two sorts of answers to this question. One appeals to the
phenomenon of gaze-tracking. 4 It is a brute fact about humans and
many other animals that we tend to turn our attention in the direction
that another person is looking.55 Thus, Bob may match Carolyn's fear
by first catching some undirected fear (or proto-fear) through
contagion, then looking to see what it is that she's looking at, and
focusing his fear on that. Another possibility is that once he begins to
feel something like fear as a result of contagion, Bob casts around in
his environment for something to which this makes sense to him as a
reaction. That is, he searches for something fearsome. Whether he
alights on the same thing as Carolyn did may depend upon many
factors: including (1) the degree to which the target of her emotion
can be read off her expressive behavior; (2) the number of possibly
salient targets for fear in the environment; and (3) the degree to
which Bob is himself susceptible to fearing the thing that Carolyn
fears.
In order to explain how it can produce a match even of such
basic emotions as anger and fear, then, contagion must be understood
as operating in a rich context that includes the environment in which
the contagion occurs and the observer's beliefs about that
environment. But once this context is properly in view, it is less
obvious that contagious empathy will be restricted to transmitting
basic emotions. It may be that the initial infection, so to speak,
54. See Goldman, supra note 49, at 106.
55. Although I cannot cite any published research on this point, my own parental
experience establishes that the phenomenon can arise at least as early as six months after birth.
It seems to be as close to "innate" as human behavior gets.
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transmits one of a relatively narrow range of basic emotional types of
experience. But then, in fixing on an object toward which the
experience will be directed, the observer may also be supplying
precisely the cognitive elements to the experience that determine
whether it is, say, a case of moral indignation or (merely) of social
offense. Even so, I grant that there may be a narrower range of
experiences that are amenable to contagious transmission than to
empathic simulation. My point here is simply that contagion
occurring in normal circumstances and in the context of a normal
human psychology may well be capable of transmitting even fairly
nuanced forms of response.56
Once we allow mechanisms of contagion to help themselves to all
these cognitive resources, though, we may seem to have effaced the
difference between contagion and simulation. Certainly there is now
some role for cognition in both sorts of process. But the role is not
the same. In fact, there remains a difference between the processes
that will turn out to be very important. To explain this, we need the
notion of "sensibility": a disposition to experience particular kinds of
emotional reactions in response to particular sorts of cues. In other
words, one's sensibility is one's pattern of tendencies toward
emotional reactions. A person's reactions may be more or less
consistent, and hence his sensibility may be more or less determinate.
It includes such things as his sense of humor, his proclivity for
embarrassment, his sensitivity to particular sorts of slights, and so on.
The difference between contagion and simulation, then, is as follows.
In contagious transmission, the emotional experience that the
observer acquires depends crucially on the model's sensibility;
whereas in a simulation, it is only the observer's own sensibility, and
not the model's, that determines what emotion(s) she experiences.
Suppose Angus behaves toward Carolyn in a way that might
elicit either offense or amusement, depending upon one's sense of
humor. 7 Suppose Carolyn is amused.
Bob might catch her
amusement through contagion, or he might try to think his way into
56. It may be more accurate to say that contagion initiates the transmission of these
cognitively richer responses. Full transmission, by hypothesis, sometimes requires not merely
the noncognitive operations of mimicry and feedback, but also the right environmental cues
and/or background beliefs in the observer. For convenience, though, I will continue in what
follows to use "contagion" more inclusively, to refer to a transmission process that can include
these further features.
57. Of course, which sort of response such behavior actually elicits would depend upon
other factors as well as Carolyn's sense of humor, but those need not concern us here.
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her circumstances, and see how he finds himself feeling. If contagion
is the effective mechanism, then it is Carolyn's sensibility (her sense
of humor in this case) that begins the process that produces Bob's
amusement. He is amused because she is inclined to find Angus's
antics funny, not rude, and he is infected with her attitude. Whereas
if Bob simulates, it is Bob's sense of humor that explains the
amusement. He is amused because he finds Angus's behavior funny
when he imagines being the one at whom it is directed.
Why is a simulator restricted to exercising his own sensibility,
rather than imaginatively adopting his model's? Contemporary
simulation accounts have tended to be vague about how much of the
simulator's own psychology stays with him when he imaginatively
places himself in someone else's shoes. In order to simulate how the
president feels at the news that his wife is moving to New York, do I
try to imagine that my wife is moving to New York and see how I
feel? Or do I first try to imagine that I'm a philanderer with the
weight of the Free World on my shoulders, and then try to imagine
that my wife is moving to New York? Of course I stand a better
chance of producing a match between my state and the model's (and
hence a better chance of accurately predicting his response) the more
of his personality and circumstances I am able to take on in the
simulative exercise. So contemporary simulationists allow that part of
what is taken on in a simulation can be beliefs and desires that the
model has, but the simulator doesn't. Crucially, though, if this
account is to maintain its autonomy from the "theory theory,"
simulation must not require that the simulator invokes beliefs about
how the model would react to a certain set of stimuli. It is important
that what actually determines the state that the simulator gets into
through simulation are his own mechanisms of emotion-formation, or
belief-formation, or desire-formation-even if these processes are
allowed to take as inputs some imaginary attitudes quite different
from his own.5 8 So there is a restriction on just how far we can
58. In replying to the charge that simulation is itself simply an exercise of theory about
states that the model ("target") will be in, given certain inputs, Goldman argues that "it seems
far-fetched to suppose that my ability to gauge what will amuse you is based on a theory of
humor (of what amuses people). I do not possess any general theory of this sort. More
plausibly, I gauge your probable reaction to a joke by projecting my own. (There can be
adjustments here for factual information about interpersonal differences, but this is just a
corrective to the basic tactic of simulation)." Alvin I. Goldman, InterpretationPsychologized, in
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 49, at 83, 84. So the simulator must exercise his own sense of
humor, it seems. The accuracy of the simulation in arriving at the model's likely response then
depends upon the similarity between the simulator's sense of humor and the model's. "A
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understand a simulator as going when he "recenters his egocentric
map. '59 While he may take (imagined versions of) another's beliefs
and desires as input, he must bring with him the psychological
processes that generate new states on the basis of those inputs.
Otherwise, this will not be a simulation, but a piece of theorizing
about how the other person would react. Hence, in the case where

the output is an emotional reaction, the simulator must bring his own
sensibility to bear on the model's circumstances.60
It follows from these considerations that the reliability of

simulation in producing matches between the emotional states of the
observer and those of the model depends strongly on the degree to
which they are alike in sensibility. 61 Whereas, since contagious
transmission is initiated by a reaction arising from the model's
sensibility, its reliability seems not to depend upon any such
similarity.

Admittedly, there is a way in which the observer's

sensibility may be pertinent to the emotion he acquires through
contagion. If, for instance, Bob were so dour that he would never,

himself, be amused by Angus' behavior, then he may be incapable of
contagiously acquiring amusement from Carolyn-or, if he does
acquire it, he may direct it at something other than Angus. If so,
Bob's own sensibility can be said to influence the results of contagion.
Note, though, that emotional reactions can be difficult to suppress,

and the salience of Angus' interaction with Carolyn may make it
difficult to focus his attention on something else as an object of
simulation of some target systems might be accurate ... if (1) the process that drives the
simulation is the same as (or relevantly similar to) the process that drives the [target] system,
and (2) the initial states of the simulating agent are the same as, or relevantly similar to, those of
the target system." Id. at 85.
59. See Gordon, supra note 37.
60. This requirement on simulation may appear to be simply a product of a turf division
within the philosophy of mind, rather than a principled restriction on what kinds of empathy are
possible. But there are good independent reasons for thinking that, insofar as simulation is a
way of empathizing, it depends on the observer's sensibility. Consider an attempt to simulate
the reaction of a person whom you know to have a very different sensibility from your own. He
is easily offended, let's suppose, and seldom amused, while you are thick-skinned and quick to
laugh. You may be able to predict his dour reactions to something that would have amused you.
But can you simulate them, and so become empathically irritated at something you are naturally
inclined to find quite funny, and not at all offensive? It seems to me highly doubtful that you
can. The point is not that simulationists are committed to supposing that we can't recognize
differences between our own sensibilities and those of other people. The point is that
simulation is not promising as a device for generating emotional congruence between people
with such differences of sensibility. Whatever its other failings, contagion therefore offers a
prospect that simulation does not. I am grateful to Heidi Feldman for pressing me to clarify this
issue.
61. Cf Alvin I. Goldman, Simulation and Interpersonal Utility, 105 ETHICS 709 (1995).
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amusement. More generally, it is a familiar phenomenon that people
who wish to take a stern attitude, and who might be disposed to do so
on their own, can be drawn in by a friend's amusement and find
themselves laughing at something they would disapprove of under
other circumstances. In any case, the main point is that only
contagion provides vicarious access to the sensibility of the model.
We shall see in the next section how this affords contagion a
distinctive role in evaluative inquiry.
Of course, the forgoing discussion does not tend to show that
contagion is more reliable than simulation, it merely demonstrates
one source of potential error in simulation from which contagion is
immune. In fact, each of these processes can go wrong in several
different ways, and it is difficult to see how to ground any general
claim about which is more reliable. The reliability of simulation
seems to depend on several things: how good we are at thinking our
way into the other's position; how emotionally responsive we are to
imagined circumstances; and how much our own dispositions to
respond resemble those of our models.62 The reliability of contagion
depends on rather different factors, including the degree to which the
model's expressive behavior accurately signals her emotional state,
the observer's ability to discern that behavior, the reliability of
mimicry and feedback, and the range of factors discussed above that
influence what the observer focuses her acquired emotional reaction
upon. In what follows I assume that each of these processes are
sometimes reliable, and explore the consequences of this assumption
for the epistemology of value.
IV. EMPATHY AND DISCOVERY

I suggested earlier that emotions play a significant role in
evaluative thought, in part because many emotional reactions present
themselves as sensitivities to values in the world. Deciding what has
62. See Roy A. Sorensen, Self-Strengthening Empathy, 58 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
REs. 75, 75, 77 (1998) (giving an interesting argument for the conclusion that evolutionary
pressures may have operated to make it the case that our dispositions to react are likely to be
quite similar). The argument runs roughly as follows: Average people are more psychologically
similar to other people than nonaverage people are. Being psychologically similar to others
makes one a better simulator of their mental states. Being a good simulator has important
benefits for fitness since (1) one's ability to anticipate the behavior of others is crucial to success
in various ways and (2) behavior can be anticipated only if one can make good predictions about
the mental states of others. Hence, selection pressures favor average psychologies; over time
the population should be expected to have tended towards increasing psychological similarity.
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value often depends upon having such reactions, and then reflecting
on their appropriateness. I highlighted a "positive" role for these
emotional experiences: they sometimes make us aware of values that
we had not previously recognized. In other words, some emotional
episodes provide us with input that can expand our sensibilities and
convictions so as to make room for new sources of value and interest.
We are now in a position to see how empathy can assist in this
process.
Let's begin with a mundane simulation. Suppose a group of
children are in the habit of teasing another child. One of the teasers
misses school one day, and the next day his friends gleefully report to
him about the especially good fun they had teasing the victim
yesterday. Now suppose that, for some reason, on hearing these
reports our protagonist begins to imagine what it would be like to be
the object of jibes like the ones his friends were administering. He
might find himself feeling pretty bad as a result of this simulation, and
thereby come to think that what they did was cruel. If so, we could
say his empathy produced an emotional reaction that led him to a
new evaluative take on the circumstances.
Does our newly sensitized schoolboy have any reason to think he
has learned something about value as a result of this simulation, and
not simply been led into weakness by these feelings? Perhaps he
does, though of course he may or may not realize this. Given the first
assumption articulated earlier, he should accord a defeasible
presumption of warrant to his reaction. In other words, the fact that
he found himself feeling hurt and indignant in his simulation counts
as some reason for thinking the teasing was cruel. Of course the
presumption is defeasible, as always, and the mere fact that he
responded in this way is only one consideration among many. But the
point is that simulating the reactions of another person does seem to
provide potentially relevant data to be weighed in thinking about this
sort of conduct.
In fact, simulation is a familiar and epistemically respectable way
to generate the emotional responses that influence our evaluative
judgments. After all, we quite commonly think that it is appropriate
to suspend judgment about something until we have had a chance to
consider how things might feel if we were in a different position. We
allow that circumstances look different from different points of view.
It is surely only reasonable to grant that judgments we make after
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seeing what things feel like from several such points of view are ipso
facto better judgments.63 This line of thinking accords with the
general principle broached earlier, that reactions are generally more
trustworthy when informed by greater experience-for instance, by
experience in both advantaged and disadvantaged roles.
What about contagion? I claim that contagion, too, has an
important role to play in evaluative inquiry. Since contagion
transmits emotional responses from model to observer, it can enable
the observer to see her circumstances in emotionally laden ways that
sensitize her to evaluative features she had not previously recognized.
But contagiously acquired emotions do not enjoy the same intuitive
support as simulated ones, in part because contagion does not arise
directly out of reflection on other ways of considering the circumstances.
Consider an example. Suppose Mara is angry at Tracy for
canceling dinner plans with her and Sam at the last minute in order to
stay late at work. Sam's a more understanding sort. He's generally
slow to conclude that he's been slighted.
Indeed, his friends
sometimes tell him that he lets people treat him like a doormat. Sam
initially sees Tracy's late cancellation as a sign of her professional
dedication, a trait he admires. But as Mara sits glowering at the
restaurant, Sam finds his relaxed mood giving way to irritation, too.
Mara points out that Tracy is always doing things like this. She just
shouldn't make plans on weeknights if she won't keep them-but she
wants to have something to do in case she runs out of steam at work.
Of course, the irritation Sam is feeling might go either way. He could
become annoyed with Mara for being so crabby.
But her
observations about Tracy's selfishness might instead combine with
Sam's feelings to bring him around to Mara's view of things: that
Tracy has mistreated them. To the extent that mistreatment is tied to
feelings of anger, if Sam thinks these feelings of aggrievement
appropriate here, he will think Tracy treated him badly. Empathy
will have played an important role in bringing him to this view of the
situation.
The idea that a contagiously induced emotion can help one to see
previously unrecognized evaluative features of ones circumstances is
63. Of course, additional information can sometimes mislead, and in this respect
perspectival information is no different. But that's just to say that the relationship between
information and good judgment is not monotonic, which is no reason for doubting that, in
general, getting more information improves judgment.
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even more plausible with respect to values that are responsedependent in the sense articulated earlier. Because responsedependent concepts accord sentiments a central role in questions
about their very application, sentimental experience and reflection on
its appropriateness have a special relevance to evaluation in responsedependent terms. If (on some other occasion) Sam is contagiously
affected by Mara's amusement, he sees features of the circumstance
as funny. From such a position he is especially likely to come to share
Mara's evaluative stance: that the situation is funny. When the
question of whether some evaluative concept applies is a matter of
sentiment, a matter of which feelings are appropriate, it becomes
possible for the impinging emotional responses of another person to
arrive as invitations (with sketchy directions) to see matters as she
does. This is because when we have an affective response to a
situation, we look for, and are sensitized to, features of the situation
that render that response at least intelligible, and at best appropriate.
Furthermore, when the values in question are response-dependent
concepts, concluding that the response is appropriate is concluding
that the thing has the value in question. This was the point of the
second assumption articulated earlier. In general, the tighter the tie is
between adopting an evaluative conviction and having some
emotional response, the more useful empathy will be in inducing
changes in the observer's evaluative stance.
Still, there is an apparent problem about contagion that the
restaurant story may help to illustrate. For surely the pretense that
we can regard convergence in emotional experience as any kind of
reason for thinking that we are coming to recognize what's really
shameful, funny, offensive, and so on, must be abandoned once we
appreciate the blind, noncognitive, and mechanistic nature of
contagious empathic transmission. To the extent that Sam is brought
around to sharing Mara's view of Tracy's behavior by unwittingly
"catching" her anger, he (and we) may be inclined to doubt whether
Tracy really mistreated them after all.
Did Tracy mistreat them? Maybe she did, maybe she didn't. As
always with such questions about the appropriateness of emotional
reactions to a situation, one must consider the details of the situation
and its history-and I haven't written these into the story. My claim
is simply that there are a number of reasons for thinking that Sam's
contagiously induced anger can properly play a role in his
deliberations about this question. First, again, this is an emotion. As
such, it is entitled to a defeasible presumption of warrant. What
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makes this case unusual is that the emotion is a product of someone
else's sensibility, rather than of Sam's.64 Perhaps Sam has special
reasons to be suspicious of his anger on just these grounds, if he has
reason for thinking Mara's sensibility is problematic (that she's
generally irascible, say, or jealous of Tracy). But I would urge that

Sam has no grounds for systematically ignoring contagiously induced
emotions because he has no grounds for supposing that other people's

reactions are generally inappropriate.
The sort of surrender to another's sensibilities that contagion
requires of us can be unsettling, to be sure. But do we have special
reason to be suspicious of the ways in which it influences our

judgment? To the extent that we take seriously the idea that there
are warranted and unwarranted ways of responding to our world, that
feelings can be appropriate or misguided, 65 we must acknowledge the
possibility that other sensibilities can be better than our own-better
at generating appropriate feelings in response to the situations that
confront us. Contagiously induced affect has no special claim to our

allegiance, of course. As with all our feelings, we can assess its
appropriateness and find it wanting. But to deny it any role in our
reflection is no more justifiable than would be a generic refusal to
consider the normative opinions of others when they conflict with our
own. 66
The psychological evidence suggests that both simulation and
contagion influence our feelings. The question now is whether this is
good news or bad. Should we celebrate only simulation, and regard
contagion as a form of contamination? My answer is no, because
contagion offers a prospect that simulation does not. In a simulation,
the simulator brings her own sensibilities to bear on another person's
situation. If this produces new feelings in her, it is her own sensibility
64. This is on the assumption that contagion has succeeded in this case in producing a
match between Sam's emotion and Mara's. David Merli reminded me that contagion can
misfire, and when it does it may induce an emotion that comes, in a sense, without the backing
of anyone's sensibility. It is an interesting question whether such emotions should also be
accorded a presumption of warrant. This would depend on articulating a fuller rationale for the
"first assumption." For present purposes, we are assuming the contagion is reliable.
65. Sentimentalists, of course, will want to take this idea very seriously, since it is with such
talk that sentiment theory hopes to capture the aspirations toward objectivity that are such a
crucial part of ethical and evaluative discourse.
66. In this connection, there are affinities between my project and some feminist critiques
of moral theory. Not only have feminist theorists urged the importance of a variety of
emotional responses to understanding morality, they have also called into question the
conception of moral agency as isolation and distance from others. Cf. BAIER, supra note 3;
GILLIGAN, supra note 3; SCHEMAN, supra note 3.
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that explains the presence of these feelings. The model's position
only determines the nature of the inputs on which the simulator
exercises her sensibilities. Contagion does something more radical. It
gives the observer vicarious access to the sensibilities of another. If
Mara's anger produces anger in Sam through contagion, he may be
enabled to see features of the circumstances and reasons for action
that he would never have experienced through mere simulation, since
his sensibility is very different from hers. Through the lens of an
emotional experience he has borrowed from her, Sam is presented
with an alternative way of viewing the facts. He sees Tracy as
mistreating him, as taking advantage of him-whereas, if left to his
own devices, Sam might never have seen her behavior this way. If
this leads to a change in Sam's judgment, that will be a change that
arises not simply from exercising his own sensibility on new inputs,
but from being influenced by the deliverances of another sensibility.
Such vicarious experiences can influence not only our convictions
about particular cases, but also our own patterns of reaction. One's
sense of humor, for instance, can be expanded to include new sources
of amusement. As a result of being brought to see something funny
in a friend's antics through contagious amusement, one can come to
see that funniness more generally in her company, where before one
was inclined to find that part of her character something to be
tolerated rather than reveled in.
To return to the restaurant episode, Sam's vicariously aroused
anger at Tracy may produce or at least initiate a change in the way he
relates to others, by leading him to expect better treatment from them
than he has in the past. If so, contagion has played an important role
in changing his sensibility. Furthermore, in the case at hand, the
change in question may plausibly be regarded as an improvement. It
is important to recognize that this is a change simulation would not
have affected. If Sam had not been present at the canceled dinner,
and had merely been imagining what it was like to be stood up in this
way, we can predict that he would not have found himself angry as a
result of that simulation because his own sensibility was not equipped
to construe the circumstances that way. By providing him with
vicarious access to a new way of taking Tracy's behavior, contagion
has done something for his evaluative perspective that simulation
could not.
Of course, not all changes in a person's sensibility are changes for
the better. One can be drawn into hateful and pernicious forms of
reaction as well, and these too can alter one's sensibility in

20001

EMPATHYAND EVALUATIVE INQUIRY

problematic ways. 67 We should not be overly sanguine about the
influence of contagion in this connection. But remember the earlier
principle that reactions are in general more reliable to the extent that
they have been subjected to wider influence. It seems to me that, as a
general matter, we should welcome contagion because of the way it
challenges an all-too-familiar kind of evaluative parochiality or
complacency. Think of the task of evaluative inquiry as that of trying
to move beyond one's present evaluative perspective, to one which is
more fully responsive to the values of things. Given this conception
of the task, one must be struck by the scarcity of resources that might
help us transcend the perspective from which we initiate our inquiry.
I've tried to show how contagion provides some such resources by
offering a point of contact and interchange between our own
sensibilities and those of other people. Perhaps that is enough to
justify the risks it brings. Philosophical critics of a sharp distinction
between passion and reason,68 and psychological studies of the role of
affect in cognition 69 have converged in recent years in agreement that
our emotional responses influence our judgments, both evaluative
and even apparently descriptive. We should reject the pernicious
idea that any such role played by the passions in the formation of our
judgments must be a form of contamination because it would leave us
with a conception of reasoned judgment-formation that human beings
could not live up to. Furthermore, it would leave us utterly without a
foundation for judgments deploying the plainly anthropocentric,
response-dependent concepts that play such an important role in our
lives. But if we do reject the pernicious idea, allowing instead that
our emotional responses can sometimes aid our judgment, then we
need to understand the influences of empathy upon these responses.
If I am right, these influences are important for advancing evaluative
inquiry.
I am no expert on the law. But I hold out some hope that this
Article offers a contribution to the discussions of experts, since it
seems to a layman that the claims I have been making are relevant to
67. It may be that, in some cases, even inappropriate and pernicious emotional reactions
are good for us, in some ways. At a minimum, they can teach us a sobering lesson about our
own capacities. And discovering how the other side feels is a way of learning to understand how
the other side thinks. This can be worth knowing in its own right, and may also assist in the
difficult task of articulating defenses of our preferred evaluations that will seem relevant to
people with different and disturbing presuppositions.
68. See, e.g., DE SOUSA, supra note 1; GREENSPAN, supra note 1.
69. See generally EMOTIONS, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR, supra note 53.
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a wide variety of legal processes and legal reasoning. Judges, juries
and legislators are routinely called upon to make evaluative
judgments of many kinds. If my claims here are plausible, then those
who study these forms of judgment cannot afford to ignore their
intimate connections to emotional responses. 70 Furthermore, in light
of the social character of legislative and judicial proceedings, the
emotional influences in question will predictably be subject to many
forms of empathetic process. Of course, legal deliberations have a
narrower focus than does generic evaluative inquiry, and it may be
that empathy's role is more salutary for the latter enterprise than the
former. Be that as it may, there should be no doubt that empathy is
at work in legal deliberations as well, and any adequate account of
these phenomena will need to understand its role.

70. I do not mean to suggest that these influences have been systematically ignored.
Indeed, the existence of this Symposium is a testament to the increasing recognition of the
importance of emotion to legal scholarship.

